Results for 'What We Do'

974 found
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  1. Francois Recanati.Can We Believe What We Do - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1).
     
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  2. Gathering the godless: intentional "communities" and ritualizing ordinary life. Section Three.Cultural Production : Learning to Be Cool, or Making Due & What We Do - 2015 - In Anthony B. Pinn, Humanism: essays on race, religion and cultural production. London: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
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  3.  93
    Believing what we do not believe: Acquiescence to superstitious beliefs and other powerful intuitions.Jane L. Risen - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (2):182-207.
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  4.  3
    What We Do Matters.Dorothy Smith-Ruiz - 2025 - Journal of World Philosophies 9 (2).
    _We are more than the circumstances of our lives, and what we do matters. In _We Are the Leaders We Are Looking For _(2024) one of the nation’s preeminent scholars and the _New York Times_ bestselling author, Dr Eddie S. Glaude Jr., argues that the challenging work of becoming a better person should be a critical feature of Black politics. We are more than the circumstances of our lives, and what we do matters. He interprets the leadership styles (...)
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  5.  23
    What We Do and Don’t Know About Joint Attention.Henrike Moll - 2024 - Topoi 43 (2):247-258.
    Joint attention is an early-emerging and uniquely human capacity that lies at the foundation of many other capacities of humans, such as language and the understanding of other minds. In this article, I summarize what developmentalists and philosophers have come to find out about joint attention, and I end by stating that two problems or questions of joint attention require additional research: 1) the relation between joint attention and the skills for dyadic sharing or affect exchange in young infants, (...)
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  6. What we do and presuppose when we demonstrate.Eduarda Calado Barbosa & Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 65 (3):e38525.
    In this paper, we defend that demonstratives are expressions of joint attention. Though this idea is not exactly new in the philosophical or linguistic literature, we argue here that their proponents have not yet shown how to incorporate these observations into more traditional theories of demonstratives. Our purpose is then to attempt to fill this gap. We argue that coordinated attentional activities are better integrated into a full account of demonstratives as meta-pragmatic information. Our claim is twofold. First, we claim (...)
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  7. What We Do When We Judge.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.
    In this paper I argue on two fronts. First, I press for the view that judging is a type of mental action, as opposed to those who think that judging is involuntary and hence not an action. Second, I argue that judging is specifically a type of non-voluntary mental action. My account of the non-voluntary nature of the mental act of judging differs, however, from standard non-voluntarist views, according to which ‘non-voluntary’ just means regulated by epistemic reasons. In addition, judging (...)
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  8.  44
    What We Do When We Resuscitate Extremely Preterm Infants.Jeremy R. Garrett, Brian S. Carter & John D. Lantos - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics 17 (8):1-3.
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  9.  51
    For what we do, and fail to do.Christopher Dodsworth, Tihamer Toth-Fejel & Zach Stangebye - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (7):29 – 31.
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  10.  72
    What We Do and Do Not Learn from Thomas Piketty.Nanette Funk - 2016 - Radical Philosophy Review 19 (2):297-311.
    Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century is not only a work of economic history and theory but also a political and normative argument and a critique of ideology. It is invaluable for its magisterial documentation of increasing inequality in capitalism, and unprecedented US economic inequality in particular. I situate it within philosophical conceptions of justice. I also identify it as a non-determinist critique of the political economy of capitalism and a substantive and methodological challenge to mainstream economics. I discuss (...)
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  11.  10
    What We Do Not Know in Common Experience.Bernard Williams - 1995 - Diogenes 43 (169):37-38.
    Whatever our profession we are all engulfed in daily life and in the obscurity and density of the mental world. Who is this “I” that finds expression in such a wide variety of societies, in the convictions of the group and temperament of the individual self, in all that I perceive imperfectly and that makes me me? What does this sometimes slippery, sometimes thorny “I” say about the various attitudes towards knowing: the things I desperately want to know, things (...)
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  12.  5
    Doing What We Do Well: How Bioethicists Can Assist in Promoting Racial Justice.Mark Kuczewski - 2024 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (10):15-17.
    Volume 24, Issue 10, October 2024, Page 15-17.
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  13.  63
    What we do not know about racial/ethnic discrimination in end-of-life treatment decisions.Ellen W. Bernal - 2006 - American Journal of Bioethics 6 (5):21 – 23.
    Wojtasiewicz (2006) raises an intriguing and concerning possibility: that end-of-life conflict resolution processes—“futility” policies—may compound discrimination against African Americans, who ha...
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  14.  25
    What We Do: Detroit in Car Advertising.Kelley Crowley - 2013 - Journal of Mass Media Ethics 28 (2):145-147.
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  15.  48
    What We Do in Private.Manuel Davenport - 1999 - Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):177-183.
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  16.  17
    What we do.Don Mannison - 1979 - Philosophical Investigations 2 (3):49-52.
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  17. What We Do and Say In Saying and Doing Something.Ramchandra Gandhi - 1984 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 11 (2):145.
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  18. What we do: The humanities and the interpretation of medicine.Kathryn Hunter - 1987 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 8 (3):367-378.
     
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  19.  18
    What We Do and Do Not Know about Teaching Medical Image Interpretation.Ellen M. Kok, Koos van Geel, Jeroen J. G. van Merriënboer & Simon G. F. Robben - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  20.  22
    What We Do when We Talk to Each Other: Conversation and Virtue in Plato's Dialogues.Branislav Kotoc - 2022 - Dissertation, King's College London
    My thesis focuses on the connection between conversation and virtue in Plato’s dialogues. It is often argued that conversation is an instrumental good - that it is conducted in order to obtain knowledge, and more precisely, knowledge of virtue. And once one obtains this knowledge, one can go about one’s life and act virtuously. I am proposing that conversation is a final good. My starting point is the analysis of the Apology, and by taking seriously Socrates’ claim at 38a that (...)
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  21.  12
    What we do and what we don’t: Paradoxes of academic writing for publishing.Dubravka Zarkov - 2019 - European Journal of Women's Studies 26 (4):357-359.
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  22.  43
    What we say and what we do: The relationship between real and hypothetical moral choices.Oriel FeldmanHall, Dean Mobbs, Davy Evans, Lucy Hiscox, Lauren Navrady & Tim Dalgleish - 2012 - Cognition 123 (3):434-441.
  23. Can we believe what we do not understand?François Recanati - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):84-100.
    In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill-understood belief (or 'quasi-belief', as I call it): (i) the quasi-believer has a validating meta-belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is 'semi-propositional'. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi-believer is semantically indeterminate, and I reject (...)
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  24. What we know and what to do.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2291-2323.
    This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A comprehensive solution (...)
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  25. Grace and Controlling What We Do Not Cause.Kevin Timpe - 2007 - Faith and Philosophy 24 (3):284-299.
    Eleonore Stump has recently articulated an account of grace which is neither deterministic nor Pelagian. Drawing on resources from Aquinas’s moral psychology, Stump’s account of grace affords the quiescence of the will a significant role in an individual’s coming to saving faith. In the present paper, I firstoutline Stump’s account and then raise a worry for that account. I conclude by suggesting a metaphysic that provides a way of resolving this worry. The resulting view allows one to maintain both (i) (...)
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  26.  13
    Willful: how we choose what we do.Richard G. Robb - 2019 - New Haven: Yale University Press.
    A revelatory alternative to the standard economic models of human behavior that proposes an exciting new way to understand decision-making "Willful is a breakthrough in economics. Richard Robb's tremendously insightful book shows how much of our behavior is not explained by existing theories of human action and explains in sparkling prose why understanding decisions made seemingly without reason presents a fuller picture of our world."--Edmund S. Phelps, Nobel Laureate in Economics Why do we do the things we do? The classical (...)
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  27.  39
    Must we mean what we do? – Review Symposium on Leys’s The Ascent of Affect.Clive Barnett - 2020 - History of the Human Sciences 33 (2):115-126.
  28.  49
    Giving Reasons for What We Do.Paul Sheldon Davies - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):135-144.
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  29.  28
    Industrial Clusters and Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries: What We Know, What We do not Know, and What We Need to Know.Peter Lund-Thomsen, Adam Lindgreen & Joelle Vanhamme - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 133 (1):9-24.
    This article provides a review of what we know, what we do not know, and what we need to know about the relationship between industrial clusters and corporate social responsibility in developing countries. In addition to the drivers of and barriers to the adoption of CSR initiatives, this study highlights key lessons learned from empirical studies of CSR initiatives that aimed to improve environmental management and work conditions and reduce poverty in local industrial districts. Academic work in (...)
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  30.  11
    What We Say and What We Do: Commentary on Chris Voparil’s Reconstructing Pragmatism.Charlene Haddock Seigfried - 2023 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 58 (4):309-317.
    Abstract:This essay seeks to untangle some of the issues that arise in multi-generational conversations. Doing so uncovers the traps set by time and place. These include how to recognize changing vocabularies, shifting interests, interpretive strategies, and multiple perspectives. It explores how speaking for, to, about, and beyond others without distortions can honestly co-exist with new things to say. It highlights Voparil’s goal of promoting active engagement with others for everyone’s benefit.
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  31.  23
    Before you know it: the unconscious reasons we do what we do.John Bargh - 2017 - New York: Touchstone.
    "The world's leading expert on the unconscious mind reveals the hidden mental processes that secretly govern every aspect of our behavior. For more than three decades, Dr. John Bargh has been conducting revolutionary research into the unconscious mind--not Freud's dark, malevolent unconscious but the new unconscious, a helpful and powerful part of the mind that we can access and understand through experimental science. Now Dr. Bargh presents an engaging and enlightening tour of the influential psychological forces that are at work (...)
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  32.  59
    We cannot empathize with what we do not recognize: Perceptions of structural versus interpersonal racism in South Africa.Melike M. Fourie & Samantha L. Moore-Berg - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Recent research suggests holding a structural, rather than interpersonal, understanding of racism is associated with greater impetus to address racial disparities. We believe greater acknowledgment of structural racism also functions to mitigate against empathic failures in response to structural injustices. Given South Africa’s situatedness as a country characterized by historical racialized oppression and continuing unjust legacies, it is appropriate to examine these ideas there. Across three studies, we tested the hypotheses that members of advantaged groups’ perspective taking and empathic concern (...)
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  33. Who We Are and What We Do: Ethnicity and Moral Agency.Karen A. Kovach - 2001 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    An array of pressing but conceptually perplexing questions in ethics---questions concerning group rights, collective responsibility, and the ethics of nationalism---would seem to require for their resolution answers to the no less perplexing questions of what social groups are and what membership in them amounts to. In this dissertation, I offer an analysis of the concept of what I call an 'ethnic identity group' and argue that questions about ethics and ethnicity or nationality are best understood as questions (...)
     
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  34.  17
    Why Do We Do What We Do?: Motivation in History and the Social Sciences.Ramsay MacMullen - 2014 - De Gruyter Open.
    This book tries to explain how decisions to act develop in the mind. Emphasis is on group decisions not only of the present but also from the past, where laboratory techniques can t apply. What emerges is a description of a process rather than the definition of a word. The description points to kinds of data that need special consideration: data regarding ideas of right and wrong, cultural traditions, emotional packaging.".
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  35. It Doesn't Matter What We Do: From Metaphysics to Ethics in Lost's Time Travel.Jeremy Pierce - 2010 - In William Irwin & Sharon Kaye, Ultimate Lost and Philosophy: Think Together, Die Alone. Wiley.
  36. What We Together Ought to Do.Alexander Dietz - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):955-982.
    I argue that we have not only individual reasons for action but also collective reasons for action: reasons which apply to us as a group. I next argue that if we together have a reason to act, then I may have a reason to do my part, but only when others will do theirs. Finally, I argue that collective reasons to do good can never make a difference to what individuals ought to do, but that other kinds of collective (...)
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  37. What We Together Can (Be Required to) Do.Felix Pinkert - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):187-202.
    In moral and political philosophy, collective obligations are promising “gap-stoppers” when we find that we need to assert some obligation, but can not plausibly ascribe this obligation to individual agents. Most notably, Bill Wringe and Jesse Tomalty discuss whether the obligations that correspond to socio-economic human rights are held by states or even by humankind at large. The present paper aims to provide a missing piece for these discussions, namely an account of the conditions under which obligations can apply to (...)
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  38.  34
    Why we think what we do about why we think what we do: Discussion on Goodman's “On thoughts without words”.Daniel C. Dennett - 1982 - Cognition 12 (2):219-227.
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  39.  23
    Jew-Greek Redux: Knowing What We Do Not Know.Clalire Katz - 2011 - philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism 1 (1):103-117.
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  40.  11
    Why do we do what we do?David Law - 2020 - Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education 24 (1):1-3.
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  41.  34
    When do we do what we do?Glenn Ross - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (4):419 - 423.
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  42. Why do we do what we do? : comparing legal methods in five law schools through survey evidence.Mathias M. Siems & Daithí Mac Síthigh - 2017 - In Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz & Edward L. Rubin, Rethinking legal scholarship: a transatlantic dialogue. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  43.  15
    Thinking or Feeling What We Do: A Response to Burton’s Social Justice Education.Rachel Wahl - 2019 - Philosophy of Education 75:620-624.
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  44. Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience.Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):375-394.
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, (...)
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  45. What We Together Do.Derek Parfit - manuscript
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  46.  90
    What We Ought to Do: The Decisions and Duties of Non-agential Groups.Olle Blomberg - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):101-116.
    In ordinary discourse, a single duty is often attributed to a plurality of agents. In "Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals", Stephanie Collins claims that such attributions involve a “category error”. I critically discuss Collins’ argument for this claim and argue that there is a substantive sense in which non-agential groups can have moral duties. A plurality of agents can have a single duty to bring about an outcome by virtue of a capacity of each to practically (...)
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  47. Wu-Wei, Merleau-Ponty, And Being Aware of What We Do.Marcus Lee - 2020 - Philosophy East and West 70 (1):116-135.
    In classical Chinese philosophy, the best kind of life is a life lived in line with the Dao (the “Way”). A core feature of this kind of life is attaining the ideal of wu-wei. In early Daoist writings, wu-wei denotes an ideal way of acting. However, since wu-wei is normally translated as “no-action” these ancient texts give us a picture of the best kind of life that may appear paradoxical to many philosophers. In this paper, I suggest a way to (...)
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  48. Nudging to donate organs: do what you like or like what we do?Sergio Beraldo & Jurgis Karpus - 2021 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy (3):329-340.
    An effective method to increase the number of potential cadaveric organ donors is to make people donors by default with the option to opt out. This non-coercive public policy tool to influence people’s choices is often justified on the basis of the as-judged-by-themselves principle: people are nudged into choosing what they themselves truly want. We review three often hypothesized reasons for why defaults work and argue that the as-judged-by-themselves principle may hold only in two of these cases. We specify (...)
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  49.  31
    Preferences: What We Can and Can’t Do with Them.Johanna Thoma - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (5).
    In her Choosing Well, Chrisoula Andreou puts forth an account of instrumental rationality that is revisionary in two respects. First, it changes the goalpost or standard of instrumental rationality to include “categorial” appraisal responses, alongside preferences, which are relational. Second, her account is explicitly diachronic, applying to series of choices as well as isolated ones. Andreou takes both revisions to be necessary for dealing with problematic choice scenarios agents with disorderly preferences might find themselves in. Focusing on problem cases involving (...)
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  50. What we can do.Arthur C. Danto - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (15):435-445.
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